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Moving on From the Ombuds Model for Data
Protection in Canada
Teresa Scassa*
Both the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA)1 and the Privacy Act2 adopt an ombuds model when it comes to
addressing complaints by members of the public. This model is also present in
other data protection laws, including public sector data protection laws at the
provincial level, as well as personal health information protection legislation. The
focus of this short paper is the model adopted in PIPEDA and its ongoing
suitability. PIPEDA was designed to apply across the full range of private sector
actors and is increasingly under strain in the big data society. These factors may
make it less well suited to the ombuds model than public sector and health sector
data protection laws.
This paper argues that it is time to move on from the ombuds model for data
protection in Canada. This will not simply require the addition of new
enforcement powers for the Privacy Commissioner, but will also entail a more
substantial reform of PIPEDA.

1. THE OMBUDS MODEL
An ombuds model is often contrasted with a regime in which there is more
active enforcement and oversight. Typically, in an ombuds model, the ombud
receives complaints and attempts to resolve them. This may involve investigation
and interactions with both parties. An ombud usually operates in contexts where
there is a significant imbalance of power, information, and resources. For
example, an ombud may manage citizen complaints against government, or
consumer complaints against a single business or against businesses operating in
a particular sector. An ombud will typically not have enforcement or disciplinary
powers.3 The goal of the ombuds model is to provide fairness and accountability,
without the need for recourse to adversarial processes. An ombud can help
citizens navigate a complex situation and can assist them in getting satisfactory
responses from the party against whom they have complained. 4
*

1
2
3

4

Canada Research Chair in Information Law and Policy, University of Ottawa, Faculty
of Law. A version of this paper was presented at the Ontario Bar Association Privacy
Summit on April 3, 2019 in Toronto.
S.C. 2000, c. 5.
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.
Carolyn Steiber, “57 Varieties: has the Ombudsman Concept become Diluted?” (2000)
16(1) Negotiation Journal 49 at 56.
Note that according to the 2017-2018 Annual Report of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada on PIPEDA, 66% of PIPEDA complaints within that time period were resolved
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However, the flexible complaint resolution approach is best adapted to
situations where the harm or issue to be addressed is relatively minor and where
it is quite specific to a particular individual or set of facts. It is less helpful for
addressing major systemic problems, for dealing with issues that have caused
significant harm, or for bringing bad actors to account. An ombuds model is
particularly ineffective against bad faith actors since, while the ombud can
recommend a resolution or measures to correct problems, there is no obligation
to comply.

2. POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER UNDER PIPEDA
Under PIPEDA, the role of the Privacy Commissioner is multifaceted and is
oriented toward improving overall compliance with the law by organizations,
while at the same time investigating and attempting to resolve complaints filed by
individuals. The Commissioner oversees PIPEDA, offers guidance, and provides
information services to the public and to organizations. Through the
Contributions Program, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) also
funds privacy research, often with the goal of supporting the development of
privacy enhancing tools such as best practices guidance or educational materials.
The Commissioner’s role in resolving complaints is consistent with an
ombuds model. As Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart (as she then was) noted,
. . . under section 11 of PIPEDA, the Commissioner is mandated to
launch investigations on receipt of complaints; she is also granted the
power to initiate her own complaint where there are reasonable
grounds to do so. Under section 12, the Commissioner is granted
extensive powers to investigate complaints, including the authority to
attempt to resolve complaints by means of dispute resolution mechanisms. Under section 13, she is mandated to prepare and deliver a report
outlining her findings, recommendations, any settlement reached by the
parties, or otherwise, and further recourse available to the complainant.
Finally, under section 25, the Commissioner must report to the
government and legislature on the activities of the Office.5

Where a complaint is filed with the OPC, the Commissioner’s role is to
investigate and to attempt to resolve the complaint. If this fails, the
Commissioner produces a non-bindin g report of findings with

5

through early resolution. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘2017—18
Annual Report to Parliament on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act and the Privacy Act—Trust but verify: Rebuilding trust in the digital
economy through independent, effective oversight” (September 2018) online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/ar_index/201718/ar_201718/>, [hereinafter ‘‘Annual Report 2017-2018”].
Jennifer Stoddart, ‘‘Cherry Picking Among Apples and Oranges: Refocusing Current
Debate About the Merits of the Ombuds-Model Under PIPEDA” (October 2005),
online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-research/2005/omb_051021/>.
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recommendations for any corrective action. An individual who seeks a binding
order or compensation for a breach of PIPEDA must apply to Federal Court,
but may only do so after going through the complaints process with the OPC. A
hearing before the Federal Court is de novo. This means that parties may
introduce new evidence and argument, and no deference is given to the findings
of the Commissioner. While a hearing de novo is consistent with the ombuds
model (showing deference to the findings of the Commissioner might discourage
the parties from fully co-operating or from making any concessions toward a
resolution of the complaint), it can be inefficient, duplicative, and does not
benefit from the Commissioner’s expertise.
In addition to the complaints mechanism, the Commissioner has some
additional compliance tools which include audit powers (s. 18) and the relatively
recently added ability to enter into compliance agreements (art. 17.1). The
Commissioner also has new responsibilities with respect to the data security
breach notification regime which came into effect on November 1, 2018. Under
this regime, the Commissioner must be notified of breaches that reach a certain
threshold of severity and can levy fines of up to $100,000 for non-compliance
with the reporting requirements. The newer powers of the Commissioner are an
indication that more is needed on the enforcement side and, as will be discussed
below, this may signal a need to replace the ombuds model.

3. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE OMBUDS MODEL
Proponents of the ombuds model highlight the fact that it provides a simple
mechanism for complaint resolution that is easy for individuals to pursue and
that is cost-free to them. Essentially, the ombud and his or her staff bear the cost
and burden of investigating complaints. By contrast, the option under s. 14 of
PIPEDA for complainants to seek an order or compensation from the Federal
Court is at their own initiative and they must bear the cost and burden. In the
vast majority of s. 14 applications that have been brought to Federal Court, the
applicant has been self-represented and in many of these cases the court has
noted that the applicant has not provided sufficient or appropriate evidence to
establish the damages they claim.6 Awards of damages in Federal Court have
been relatively low; in such circumstances, an ombuds approach would seem
much more effective for resolving complaints while sheltering individuals from
the costs and burdens of litigation.
6

See, e.g.: Townsend v. Sun Life Financial, 2012 FC 550, 2012 CF 550, 2012 CarswellNat
2083, 2012 CarswellNat 3028, [2012] F.C.J. No. 77, 103 C.P.R. (4th) 424, 217 A.C.Q.S.
(3d) 516, 408 F.T.R. 279 (F.C.); Miglialo v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2018 FC 525, 2018 CF
525, 2018 CarswellNat 2703, 2018 CarswellNat 3189, 293 A.C.W.S. (3d) 176 (F.D.);
Girao v. Zarek Taylor Grossman Hanrahan LLP, 2011 FC 1070, 2011 CF 1070, 2011
CarswellNat 3670, 2011 CarswellNat 4460, [2011] F.C.J. No. 1310, 207 A.C.W.S. (3d)
350, 338 D.L.R. (4th) 262, 397 F.T.R. 108, 96 C.P.R. (4th) 220) (F.C.); Montalbo v. Royal
Bank of Canada, 2018 FC 1155, 2018 CF 1155, 2018 CarswellNat 7067, 2018
CarswellNat 8099, 299 A.C.W.S. (3d) 199 (F.C.).
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Another advantage of the ombuds model, certainly as practised by the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada under PIPEDA, is that it is meant not only to
resolve a particular complaint, but to identify lessons to be learned more broadly.
Thus, while the report of findings emerging from a particular complaint is related
specifically to its resolution, the Commissioner may draw on the situation for
broader lessons that can be learned and applied in other contexts and by other
organizations. In 2005, former Commissioner Stoddart observed that the fact
that the Commissioner’s findings were non-binding and carried no precedential
weight was entirely consistent with the ombuds model. She wrote:
. . . stare decisis would obviate some of the essential underpinnings of
an effective ombuds-model. In order for this latter model to work,
parties must come to the process secure in the knowledge that their
individual circumstances will be addressed and confident that they can
participate in, and help drive the outcome towards their own negotiated
resolution.7

This soft-compliance model may also be more conducive to encourage
organizations to modify and improve their practices. If there is no threat of
stiff monetary penalties, prosecution, or even naming of names in the report of
findings, organizations may be more willing to admit their errors or to agree to
change their policies and procedures.8 They may also be more willing to seek
advice from the Commissioner. Former Commissioner Stoddart saw the ombuds
model as promoting transformation and not just resolving individual disputes.
She wrote of the importance of the development of a lasting culture of privacy
sensitivity among the parties through their willing and active involvement in the
process itself,” and observed that ‘‘[i]n order to achieve these twin goals, the
process must necessarily be flexible, participative and individuated in its
approach”.9

4. DISADVANTAGES OF THE OMBUDS MODEL FOR PRIVACY
PROTECTION
In spite of its advantages, the ombuds model has some significant drawbacks
and these are becoming more acute as personal information increases in value
and importance in the big data economy. As former Commissioner Stoddart has
noted, PIPEDA represents a ‘novel’ application of the ombuds model in some

7
8

9

Ibid.
See, e.g.: Broutzas v. Rouge Valley Health System, 2018 CarswellOnt 17809, 2018 ONSC
6317, 299 A.C.W.S. (3d) 26 (Ont. S.C.), where the court discussed the value of the
ombuds approach (in this case, under Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5.)
in encouraging organizations to admit their errors and to improve their internal handling of
personal information.

Stoddart, supra note 5.
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key respects. In the first place, it is created by the government for oversight of
private sector activity. Stoddart observed:
. . . unlike the use made of the ombuds-model by private sector
organizations to regulate themselves individually or collectively by
industry, the ombudsman role envisaged by PIPEDA extends to all
private commercial activity, across a wide variety of sectors and
industries.10

The scope and breadth of application is significant — and the growing
importance of data in the big data economy creates extraordinary demand on the
soft-resolution approach to addressing complaints. The current Privacy
Commissioner has called for the power to be more selective about which
complaints are investigated, as a means of more effectively managing scarce
resources and targeting more systemic issues.11 This is not consistent with an
ombuds model, yet it may be necessary in the changing privacy context. In
addition, the growing volume of issues that affect a significant number of
individuals and that create privacy harms that are not unique to specific
complainants, also pose challenges to the ombuds model.
Writing in 2005, Commissioner Stoddart noted that the adoption of the
ombuds model under PIPEDA created misunderstandings ‘‘rooted in a
fundamental mismatch between the conceptual nature and characteristics of
the ombudsman role and the regulatory-type controls governments are expected
to wield over ‘nefarious’ private sector activity.”12 This mismatch has become
even more acute over time. The ombuds model is even less well suited to the types
of complex problems raised by the processing of personal information for big
data analytics and artificial intelligence (AI). It may also be ill-adapted to the
large-scale collection of data, its repurposing, and its widespread sharing. In
2018, current Commissioner Daniel Therrien noted that ‘‘we have reached a
critical tipping point upon which privacy rights and democratic values are at
stake”.13
As noted earlier, the ombuds model is designed to work in contexts where
there is an imbalance of power. This is often the case when dealing with
companies engaged in large-scale collection and trading of personal information.
There is also a deepening lack of transparency around data collection and
processing. However, it is not clear that an ombuds model is best suited to
address the problems that arise in these contexts. First, where the problems are
major and systemic, they will potentially affect a vast number of people, making
10
11

12
13

Ibid.
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Submission to Innovation, Science and Economic
Development Canada (23 November 2018) online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opcactions-and-decisions/submissions-to-consultations/sub_ised_181123/> [hereinafter
‘‘Submission”].
Stoddart, supra note 5.
OPC, ‘‘Submission,” supra note 1.
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individual complaint resolution ineffectual. Further, companies may be unwilling
to change lucrative business practices without hard obligations to comply. In
some cases, significant monetary penalties may be necessary not just to compel
compliance, but to deter future breaches of the law. This is why Europe’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has prescribed much more rigorous and
extensive enforcement powers.
The ombuds model favours soft resolution, meaning that the Commissioner
does not issue binding decisions and has no order-making powers. This has
several adverse effects that may be becoming more acute. First, individuals or the
Commissioner are required to take additional actions in court to obtain binding
orders, which adds a further layer of effort and delay. Second, the
Commissioner’s non-binding recommendations do not create a body of useful
precedent that can be applied. Instead, precedent is developed in those few cases
brought to the Federal Court by particularly aggrieved yet un-represented
individuals. The specialized expertise of the Commissioner is drowned out in
these court decisions that are based on de novo proceedings involving unrepresented claimants.
A sense that there is a growing disrespect or disregard for data protection
rules among many organizations (particularly in the tech sector) is not helped by
soft compliance measures which provide no real incentive for companies to
comply. If non-compliance with the legislation carries few actual costs, it may be
seen as preferable to compliance.
As the risks and harms from privacy breaches grow, soft compliance may be
seen as inadequate and insufficient, and may be entirely unsatisfactory to
complainants. The sharp rise in privacy class action law suits may support the
general lack of satisfaction with PIPEDA-based recourses.
In 2005, former Commissioner Stoddart linked the success of the ombud’s
model to the flexible normative provisions found in the CSA Model Code that
has been incorporated into PIPEDA. She wrote:
. . . the inherent flexibility of the CSA Code in PIPEDA enables
individuals and private sector organizations to resolve potential
conflicts themselves through the application of general fair information
principles to specific fact situations. Through its principles, PIPEDA
offers the necessary tools and guidance of a self-correcting scheme.14

This link between the drafting of the statute and the ombuds model is important
since it is not just the ombuds model that is currently being challenged by those
seeking reform of PIPEDA, but also the nature and wording of the normative
provisions.
Commissioner Stoddart suggested that the incorporation of the CSA Model
Code into PIPEDA provided the flexibility and generality that supported an
ombuds-type approach to privacy complaint resolution. However, there have
been repeated calls for reform of PIPEDA to tighten up its obligations,
14

Ibid.
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particularly in light of the impact of big data analytics. Commissioner Stoddart
wrote: ‘‘Calls for greater specificity of language and more prescriptive
requirements seem to be at complete odds with a scheme based on the ombuds
approach to resolving disputes.”15 This conflict between demands for reform of
the normative provisions of PIPEDA and the ombuds role of the Commissioner
suggests that the ombuds model may no longer be appropriate in our rapidly
evolving technological context.

5. THE ARGUMENT FOR GREATER ENFORCEMENT POWERS
In recent years there have been a growing number of calls for reform of
PIPEDA. These calls for reform touch on some of the key aspects of the ombuds
model, thus suggesting that there is momentum behind demands for a major shift
in approach in this area. For example, in a 2010 study commissioned by the
OPC, Houle and Sossin reported: ‘‘Our research leads us to believe that there is a
shift toward ensuring greater protection of consumers, which will need to be
addressed by granting other specific powers to the OPC.”16 The authors also
raised the issue of whether the challenges presented by the platform-based digital
environment of the time were suitable for resolution using the ombuds model.
Since 2010, technology has continued to evolve and the same concerns can be
raised even more forcefully regarding the suitability of the ombuds model for
addressing the abuses of personal information that are now rampant in the big
data environment.
Houle and Sossin found that there were significant issues with PIPEDA
compliance. They wrote: ‘‘notwithstanding the important successes of the OPC,
compliance levels with PIPEDA arguably remain too low, and the risk that
consumers face with their personal information in the hands of small and
medium-sized businesses in Canada arguably is too high”.17 Interestingly, the
authors found that the ombuds model was more effective with large businesses
than with small and medium-sized businesses; it was for this latter category of
enterprises that the authors found a need for more compliance tools. In the big
data era, stronger compliance tools may be needed for large enterprises as well —
at least for those companies for which personal data is the stock-in-trade. In the
fall of 2018, Commissioner Therrien called for legislative reform. He wrote:
The reality is that our principles-based law is quite permissive and gives
companies wide latitude to use personal information for their own
benefit. While our law should probably continue to be principles-based
15
16

17

Stoddart, supra note 5.
France Houle & Lorne Sossin, ‘‘Powers and Functions of the Ombudsman in the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act: An Effectiveness
Study,” Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (August 2010) online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-research/2010/
pipeda_h_s/>.
Ibid.
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and technologically neutral, it must be right-based and drafted not as
an industry code of conduct but as a statute that confers rights, while
allowing for responsible innovation.18

The call for stronger compliance is also rooted in the global nature of the
information economy. As other comparable jurisdictions (most notably those in
the EU) move to both stronger normative protection for privacy and stricter
compliance mechanisms, Canada is increasingly an outlier. While an ombuds
model may be well suited for a single large corporation or a well-defined sector of
industry, it may simply not be workable across a broad range of sectors in a
rapidly expanding big data economy and in relation to information that flows
freely across borders. The scale of the trade in personal data and the potential for
its use, reuse, and abuse may simply require a different normative model, with
more substantive enforcement mechanisms. Where there are enormous profits to
be made and non-compliance with legislation carries no real cost, then noncompliance becomes a business option.
The current federal Privacy Commissioner has been outspoken in his belief
that PIPEDA must move away from the ombuds model. In his 2016-2017 Annual
Report to Parliament he identified the many challenges to privacy in the digital
age and stated ‘‘we are convinced the combination of proactive enforcement and
demonstrable accountability is far more likely to achieve compliance with
PIPEDA and respect for privacy rights than the current ombudsman model. 19.
More recently, the House of Commons Committee on ETHI recommended, in
its review of PIPEDA, that ‘‘the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act be amended to give the Privacy Commissioner enforcement
powers, including the power to make orders and impose fines for noncompliance”. 20 They also recommended amending PIPEDA to include
significant additional substantive privacy rights, including rights of data
portability and erasure, and a right to withdraw consent.
Former Commissioner Stoddart, in her explanation of the advantages of the
ombuds model and its consistency with other features of PIPEDA, appears to
strongly defend the ombuds model. Yet, her argument is more properly
characterized as maintaining that multiple features of PIPEDA are specifically
designed for the ombuds model and that greater enforcement powers may require
18

19

20

Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Submission,” supra note 11. The Commissioner also
called for stronger enforcement powers.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘2016-17 Annual Report to Parliament
on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Privacy
Act — Real fears, real solutions
A plan for restoring confidence in Canada’s privacy regime” (September 2017) online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/ar_index/201617/ar_201617/>.

Bob Zimmer, ‘‘Towards Privacy By Design: Review Of The Personal Information
Protection And Electronic Documents Act — Report of the Standing Committee on
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics” (February 2018) online: <http://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/RP9690701/ethirp12/ethirp12e.pdf> at 3.
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more substantive reforms. It follows as well that more recent calls for reform of
the normative provisions of PIPEDA may also entail a move away from the
ombuds model. As Commissioner Stoddart wrote:
. . . the ombudsman model has its own set of attributes and benefits
inherent in its underlying philosophy. We should be examining whether
that model in its integrity continues to meet Canadians’ needs for
privacy protection. If not, we should be thinking outside the box
towards other more innovative and appropriate approaches – not
cherry picking among the essential features that made the ombudsmodel attractive in the first place, choosing to completely ignore some
of them while imposing other aspired attributes that would be wholly
inconsistent with its fundamental purpose.21

Current Commissioner Therrien clearly seeks to move beyond the ombuds
model. In the OPC’s 2017—2018 Annual Report to Parliament he wrote:
‘‘Canadians need stronger privacy laws that will protect them when
organizations fail to do so. Respect for those laws must be enforced by a
regulator, independent from industry and the government, with sufficient powers
to ensure compliance.”22

CONCLUSION
Changes in the value and importance of data within the big data economy,
and the resultant changes in the nature of the harms to be addressed by improper
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information make it increasingly
important for Canada to update PIPEDA, its private sector data protection law.
Calls to change the ombuds model to one in which the Commissioner has
greater order-making and enforcement powers reflect this desire for new ways to
hold organizations accountable. However, the legislative deficiencies are not
limited to enforcement powers. There are clearly two necessary parts to a move
away from the ombuds model — a reinvigorated set of legal norms and new
enforcement powers.

21
22

Stoddart, supra note 5.
OPC, Annual Report 2017—2018, supra note 4.

